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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Respondent,

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

:

v.

:

LARRY PASCOE,

:

Case No. 870269-CA

:

Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction of
vehicle homicide, a third degree felony following a jury trial held
May 5, 6, 7, and 8, 1987, before the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick
of the Third District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of
Utah.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On June 7, 1986, at about 11:45 p.m., Mr. Pascoe was
involved in a two-vehicle collision on 12600 South in Salt Lake
County (T. 118). Both vehicles were pickup trucks (T. 120, 133).
The driver of the other pickup, Mr. Jeff Chandler, was killed at the
scene (T. 337-338).
269).

No passengers were in either car (T. 134, 252,

Mr. Pascoe was transported from the scene to a local hospital

in an ambulance (T. 360). Following examination, a blood draw for
use as evidence, and x-rays at the hospital, Mr. Pascoe was placed
under arrest and transported to the Salt Lake County Jail (T. 44).
At a pre-trial motion to suppress the blood alcohol
result, the following facts were elicited regarding the blood draw.

At the scene of the accident, Mr. Pascoe kept asking to leave but
was told by a police officer he could not go (T. 26). Deputy
Mitchell, who followed the ambulance to the hospital, had determined
Mr. Pascoe was probably under the influence of alcohol (T. 37-38).
Prior to the blood draw at the hospital/ the deputy informed
Mr. Pascoe they were there to draw blood (T. 41/ 51). After
Mr. Pascoe asked "why," the deputy responded he believed he had
probable cause to suspect Mr. Pascoe of driving under the influence
of alcohol (T. 41/ 52). Although Deputy Mitchell was aware
Mr. Chandler had died/ he did not tell Mr. Pascoe he was being
investigated for homicide (T. 47). Apparently/ Mr. Pascoe said
"okay" and held his arm out.

Ld.

The blood was drawn at 12:51 a.m.

(T. 42). The technician who drew the blood and who was present
during the verbal exchange between Deputy Mitchell and Mr. Pascoe
indicated that although Mr. Pascoe cooperated and knew he was going
to have his blood drawn, the technician could not say that the
cooperation was based upon informed consent (T. 49/ 59-60).
Mr. Pascoe was told he was under arrest at 2:35 a.m. (jld.) and then
transported to jail (T. 44).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Mr. Pascoe's lawyer was improperly denied opportunity to
conduct voir dire. Additionally/ because of the erroneous admission
of the results of Mr. Pascoe's blood alcohol results taken when he
was not under arrest and without his actual consent and because of
the trial court*s erroneous admission of cumulative and prejudicial
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photographs, Mr. Pascoe was erroneously convicted.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY IMPROPERLY RESTRICTING
DEFENSE COUNSEL'S QUESTIONING OF PROSPECTIVE
JURORS DURING VOIR DIRE,
During the course of voir dire, defense counsel asked the
Court to ask the prospective jurors "whether they have directly or
indirectly worked with insurance agencies or claim adjustment or
claim bureau[s] . . .."(Transcript of voir dire, at 28). The trial
court refused to pose the question to the panel. Id.
The scope of voir dire is a matter left to the sound
discretion of the trial court.

The trial court's rulings will not

be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion.

Maltby v. Cox

Const. Co./ Inc.y 598 P.2d 336, 341 (Utah 1979), cert, denied, 444
U.S. 945 (1979).

An abuse of discretion occurs when, "considering

the totality of the questioning, counsel [is not] afforded an
adeqaute opportunity to gain the information necessary to evaluate
jurors."

State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 448 (Utah 1988).

One of

the purposes of voir dire is to elicit sufficient information from
jurors "to permit informed exercise of peremptory challenge[s]."
State v. Taylor, 664 P.2d 439, 447 (Utah 1983).

In State v. Ball,

685 P.2d 1055 (Utah 1984), the Court found reversible error in the
trial court's failure to allow questions regarding whether
abstinence from alcohol was for a religious reason.
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The Court

indicated exploration of group memberships was important to discover
actual bias or prejudice.

Similarly, in Hornsby v. Corp. of the

Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints,
87 Utah Adv. Rep. 23 (Utah App. 1988), this Court vacated a judgment
and remanded the case for a new trial because of improperly limited
voir dire.
Utah's Supreme Court has likewise indicated, "discretion
should be liberally exercised in favor of allowing counsel to elicit
information from prospective jurors."
Adv. Rep. 21, 24 (Utah 1988).

State v. Worthen, 89 Utah

Both conscious and subconscious

attitudes and biases need to be explored. JLd. at 24.

In Worthen,

the Court stated "[a]11 that is necessary for a voir dire question
to be appropriate is that it allow 'defense counsel to exercise his
peremptory challenges more intelligently.'"
Ball.

Ij3. citing State v.

The Court continued, "[peremptory challenges are designed to

allow an opportunity to remove a juror, not because he or she is
prejudiced as to the particular facts of the case but for more
general biases that affect how a juror may perceive and evaluate
witnesses, parties and evidence."

Worthen at 24. The Court stated,

"[v]oir dire should not be restricted to a 'stark little exercise'
which discloses little." J[d. at 25.
Defense counsel in the case at bar was attempting to
explore potential biases by learning whether prospective jurors
might know about how insurance companies handle these cases. That
knowledge would have permitted defense counsel to explore potential
biases or knowledge regarding defenses to insurance claims or
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indications that these people might, as claims adjustors, have close
working relationships with law enforcement agencies.

Because

defense counsel's voir dire was improperly limited, Mr. Pascoe's
conviction ought to be reversed.

POINT II.
THE TRIAL COORT ERRED BY REFUSING TO SUPPRESS
THE RESULTS OF MR. PASCOE'S BLOOD TEST.
At the pre-trial hearing on Mr. Pascoe's Motion to
Suppress his blood alcohol results, the following facts were
presented to the court.

Mr. Pascoe was sent to the hospital in an

ambulance but was not under arrest at the time.

(T. M. to S.* 15,

21, 26, 30). While at the hospital, a deputy informed Mr. Pascoe he
was there to draw blood (T. M. to S. 40-41).

When Mr. Pascoe asked

the officer why he wanted blood from him, the officer testified he
"advised him to the effect that we had reason to believe that he was
under the influence of alcohol, and that we were drawing blood based
on that probable cause."

(T. M. to S. 41). Mr. Pascoe never was

arrested for driving under the influence, but instead was eventually
arrested for vehicle homicide (R. 3 ) . The blood was drawn at
12:51 a.m.; yet, Mr. Pascoe was not told he was under arrest until
2:35 a.m. (T. M. to S. 42). He was not told prior to his giving the
blood it would be used as evidence against him, nor was he told he
was the subject of a homicide investigation (R. M. to S. 47).

* Now and hereafter, transcript of this motion will be
referred to as "T. M. to S."
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Mr. Pascoe was not advised of his rights, informed of the nature of
the blood test, or warned of the consequences of refusing to submit
to the test before the sample was drawn (T. M. to S. 46-47).
The laboratory technician who drew the sample remembered
Mr. Pascoe had some question as to why the blood was being drawn
(T. M. to S. 52). He further testified Mr. Pascoe had a
conversation with the deputy outside the technician's presence
before Mr. Pascoe held his arm out and said "okay."
54-56).

(T. M. to S.

The technician never actually conversed with Mr. Pascoe

(T. M. to S. 54). The technician testified "[Mr. Pascoe] knew he
was going to have his blood drawn, and he consented to that. That's
all I know."

(T. M. to S. 60). The technician could not say that

this was an informed consent (T. M. to S. 60).
Because Mr. Pascoe's blood was neither drawn subsequent
to his arrest nor with his consent, the trial court erred by failing
to suppress it (T. M. to S. 78).

A.

MR. PASCOE WAS NOT UNDER ARREST AT THE TIME
HIS BLOOD WAS DRAWN; THEREFORE, THE EVIDENCE
DID NOT PALL WITHIN THE SEARCH INCIDENT TO AN
ARREST EXCEPTION TO WARRANTLESS SEARCHES.

In Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 86 S.Ct. 1826,
16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966), the Supreme Court addressed the question of
whether the evidence of blood alcohol results should have been
excluded as the product of an unconstitutional search and seizure.
In Schmerber, the officer had probable cause to arrest the
petitioner, informed the petitioner he was under arrest, and advised
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him regarding his right to remain silent, his right to an attorney,
and, further, that anything he said would be used against him as
evidence before the blood was drawn.

JTd. at 768-69.

The Court

recognized the impractical nature of seeking a magistrate to issue a
warrant prior to taking the sample because alcohol in the blood may
diminish due to metabolism,

jcd. at 771.

The warrantless search was

upheld as a valid search incident to Mr. Schmerber's arrest.

This

Court likewise has found requiring an accused to submit to a blood
test following a lawful arrest does not violate the fourth or
fourteenth amendments to the federal constitution.

In re I,, R.L.,

739 P.2d 1123, 1125 (Utah App. 1987).
In the case at bar, Mr. Pascoe was not placed under
arrest until after his blood was drawn.

Although Mr. Pascoe was

told by officers at the scene he was not free to leave (T. M. to S.
15), he was not told why he could not leave.

He could reasonably

have believed the officers were concerned he receive proper medical
attention by going to the hospital and later, while at the hospital,
by submitting to medical examinations and procedures.
Similarly, while in the ambulance, Mr. Pascoe asked to
leave and was told by Officer Peterson he could not (T. M. to S.
26).

At the Motion to Suppress hearing, Peterson testified he did

not tell Mr. Pascoe he was under arrest, because he was alone in the
ambulance with him and he feared for his safety.

He testified he

did not want to agitate Mr. Pascoe by telling him he was under
arrest (T. M. to S. 26). While in the ambulance, Peterson told
Mr. Pascoe, "[Ljet's worry more about getting you to the hospital
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than worrying about all this other stuff right now."
27).

(T. M. to S.

Once Mr. Pascoe arrived at the hospital, at least one other

law enforcement officer was present, so the fear of a possible
hostile response would have been diminimus at most; yet, Mr. Pascoe
still was not told he was under arrest (T. M. to S. 32-33, 37-41).
Utah's legislature has defined an arrest as the "actual
restraint of the person arrested or submission to custody."
Code Ann. §77-7-1 (1982).

Utah

The legislature also requires the person

making the arrest to "inform the person being arrested of his
intention, cause and authority to arrest him."
§77-7-6 (1982).

Utah Code Ann.

That statute allows for limited exceptions where

notice might endanger the life or safety of others or where arrest
during the attempt to commit the crime, actual commission of the
crime, or flight after commission of the crime makes giving notice
virtually impossible.
Substantially similar statutes were interpreted in
State v. Beckendorf, 10 P.2d 1073 (Utah 1932).

In that case, police

officers had a warrant for the search and seizure of liquor,
apparently at the Beckendorf home. jrd. at 1074. The defendant came
to the door but did not open it. Officers gained entry and found
the defendant and her son in the bathroom destroying what they
believed was liquor. J^d.

When Ms. Beckendorf attempted to prevent

the officers from seizing a jug, one officer ordered another to
"take her away."

^id. at 1075. When the officer took her by the

wrist, she kicked him in the groin and he forcibly removed her to
the kitchen despite her "kicking and hollering."
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JLd. The Court

stated, "there is no evidence that any officer ever informed or
advised the defendant that she was under arrest or that her removal
from the bathroom was intended as such."

Id.

The Court stated:

We are unable to subscribe to the proposition that
. . . the bare act of taking her into the kitchen
constituted an arrest or an attempt to arrest. It
appears rather that the officer had the intention
only of removing her from the scene of the search
and to prevent her interference.
Id. at 1076.

The Court stated, "[n]otice of arrest should be given,

either expressly or by implication, and without such notice no
amount of physical restraint can constitute an arrest.n

icL

The

Court continued:
The act relied upon as constituting an arrest must
have been performed with the intent to effect an
arrest and must have been so understood by the
person sought to be arrested. A forcible seizure
of one's person, without any pretense of taking
him into legal custody, does not amount to an
arrest.
Id. (citations omitted).

In reversing her conviction, the Court

reasoned because the officers had opportunity to arrest
Ms. Beckendorf but failed to advise her of an arrest, she could not
be charged with resisting an arrest she could not know was being
made.

Id.
The same rationale applies to the case at bar.

Officers

had ample opportunity to arrest Mr. Pascoe either at the scene of
the crime or at the hospital.

With the limited exception of the

brief ambulance ride where only one officer was with Mr. Pascoe, no
officers testified they believed notifying him of his arrest might
endanger anybody.

Deputy Mitchell testified he called for backup
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assistance from the West Jordan City Police prior to arresting
Mr. Pascoe, because a friend of Mr. Pascoe's had been at the scene
and at the hospital "caus[ing] some commotion.•

(T. M. to S. 43).

Although the testimony regarding when backup officers arrived is
unclear, it is unlikely they did not reach the hospital soon after
Mr. Pascoe did.

Deputy Mitchell also testified there were other

officers at the scene of the accident (T. M. to S. 43), and he gave
no indication of any situation which caused them to be unable to
arrest Mr. Pascoe at the scene.
Similarly, this was not a case of officers catching
somebody during the commission of or flight after commission of a
crime.

The crime had already been committed by the time the

officers arrived at the scene, and although Mr. Pascoe asked if he
could leave, he made no attempt to flee from the scene or the
hospital.

Under the reasoning of State v. Beckendorf and the Utah

statutes on arrest, Mr. Pascoe was not under arrest at the time of
his blood draw.

Therefore, unless this Court finds Mr. Pascoe

consented to the seizure, the results of his blood draw should be
suppressed.

B.

MR. PASCOE DID NOT WAIVE HIS RIGHT TO BE FREE
FROM AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL SEIZURE BECAUSE HE
DID NOT CONSENT TO HAVING HIS BLOOD DRAWN.

Utah's implied consent statute was recently interpreted
by this Court in In re I., R.L., 739 P.2d 1123 (Utah App. 1987).
that case, the defendant was similarly involved in a head-on
collision.

Two investigating police officers in In re I., R.L.
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In

thought the defendant was probably driving under the influence of
alcohol because of his speech, physical behavior and odor of
alcohol.

Icl. at 1124.

As in the case at bar, the defendant was

sent to the hospital in an ambulance but Was not placed under arrest
at the time.

_Id-

At

the time blood was drawn from Mr. I. by a

technician at the hospital, he, like Mr. Pascoe, had not been
informed the purpose of the blood test was to determine his blood
alcohol content.1
In examining Utah's implied consent law, Utah Code Ann.
§41-6-44.10(a) and (b) (1981), this Court found that although the
"statute appears to legislatively create actual consent to a
chemical test on behalf of any person operating a motor vehicle, it
does not."

I., R.L. at 1127.

"[I]mplied consent by statute cannot

supercede an otherwise constitutionally protected right."

Id.

relying on State v. Cruz, 446 P.2d 307 (Utah 1968), which found
implied consent only controls once an accused is placed under
arrest.2
Drawing of blood from a suspect at the request of police
for use as evidence is a warrantless search.

1

Therefore, it can

In both Schmerber and I., R.L., the courts also
examined the issue of whether the blood draw was made in conformity
with accepted medical procedures. Mr. Pascoe does not contest the
medical procedure employed in his case.
2
The statute analyzed in Cruz, using the language
"arresting officer" has since been amended to include the words
"peace officer" instead. Cruz at 308, I., R.L. at 1127 n.5. This
Court found the new language did not violate the constitutional
protections involved. I., R.L. at 1128.
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be constitutionally upheld only if:
(1) There is probable cause to believe the
suspect was driving or in control of a motor
vehicle while having a statutorily prohibited
blood alcohol content,
(2)

The suspect was arrested, and,

(3) The method of extraction of blood was
reasonable.
I., R.L,, at 1128.

This Court found because Mr. I. was not under

arrest, the warrantless search was not constitutionally sound under
Utah's implied consent statute.
However, the right to be free from unconstitutional
search and seizures can be waived if the accused gives actual
consent.

I., R.L., at 1126.

This Court noted "Consent . . .

is not

to be lightly inferred, but should be shown by clear and convincing
evidence. . . .*"

j^d., n.3 quoting from 68 Am. Jur. 2d Searches and

Seizures, §46 (1973).

This Court found that Mr. I. did not give

actual consent because he offered resistance and was not informed
the blood was being drawn to determine his blood alcohol content.
I., R.L. at 1128.
have been excluded.

This Court found his blood test therefore should
Id.

Mr. Pascoe did not give actual consent to the blood
draw.

Although he did not resist the technician, he was never

specifically informed the blood was being drawn to determine his
blood alcohol content (T. M. to S. 41). He likewise was not told
the blood was being collected to be used as evidence against him in
a homicide investigation, nor was he told the consequences of
refusing to have his blood drawn (T. M. to S. 47). Because
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Mr. Pascoe was in the hospital and still under the care of the
examining physician, he could easily have believed the blood was
being drawn for medical purposes, when he held his arm out.

Under

the standards set forth by this Court in In re I., R.L., it cannot
be deemed Mr. Pascoe gave actual consent to having his blood drawn
for use as evidence against him.

Therefore, the results of the

blood test should have been suppressed, because they were drawn in
violation of Mr. Pascoe's right to be free from unconstitutional
searches and seizures.

POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY
ADMITTING PREJUDICIAL AND CUMULATIVE PHOTOGRAPHS.
Over Mr. Pascoe's objection, the trial court admitted
exhibits numbers eleven and twelve, photographs of parts of the
deceased's red truck which Mr. Chandler had been driving (T. 266,
290).

Trial counsel indicated either exhibit would be acceptable

but not both (T. 266). Both of those exhibits portrayed in eleven
by fourteen inch color photographs fenders or portions of the red
truck which had been scattered by the impact.

Skid marks on the

pavement are essentially the same in both photographs.
pavement markings are likewise essentially the same.

Road
Mr. Chandler's

shoe which was found on the pavement is in view in both
photographs.

The angles from which both photographs were taken is

also similar.
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The trial court also admitted exhibits ten, fifteen and
sixteen over Mr. Pascoe's objection (T. 266, 290). Again, trial
counsel indicated one photograph would not be objectionable, but
three were cumulative (T. 266). All three of these eleven by
fourteen inch color photographs depict the red truck which
Mr. Chandler was driving and Mr. Chandler's body covered by a white
sheet.

Exhibit number fifteen only shows a portion of the red

truck.

Exhibit number ten shows the truck in a more distant

position than either of the other two exhibits but depicts the truck
in its entirety.

Exhibit number sixteen reveals a well-lit close-up

view of both the truck and the body.

All three exhibits reveal the

passenger side of the truck and only exhibit number fifteen does not
show the hood of the truck.
Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides for the
exclusion of evidence even if it is relevant, if the "probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice
• . . or by considerations of . . . needless presentation of
cumulative evidence."

In State v. Garcia, 663 P.2d 60 (Utah 1983),

the Utah Supreme Court considered the admissibility of gruesome
photographs and recognized the admission of such photographs is a
matter left to the trial court's discretion.

A trial court's

decision to admit photographs will not be overturned absent a
showing of an abuse of discretion.

Id.

at 64.

In State v. Poe, 441 P.2d 512 (Utah 1968) (Poe I), such
an abuse of discretion was found.

The Court reversed Poe's

conviction, because the photographs were admitted for the sole
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purpose of "inflam[ing] and arous[ing] the jury."

_I(3. at 515.

Again in State v. Wells, 603 P.2d 810 (Utah 1979), the Utah Supreme
Court found error (although deemed harmless) in the trial court's
admission of photographs of a homicide victim, because the evidence
was already before the jury and the evidence was not in dispute.
Therefore, the Court reasoned, the photographs were "superfluous."
Id. at 813.
Again, in State v. Cloud, 722 P.2d 750 (Utah 1986), the
Utah Supreme Court reversed a homicide conviction on the basis of
the erroneous admission of prejudicial photographs.

The Court noted

the standard set forth in Garcia established the general principle
that potentially prejudicial photographs are "generally
inappropriate," unless their essential evidentiary value outweighs
their prejudicial impact.

In Cloud, the issues for which the

photographs were admitted was conceded, so the photographs could not
contribute essential evidentiary value.

Jj3. at 753.

In the case at bar, trial counsel conceded to the
admission of any one photograph in each of the contested sets
offered by the State but not to all of the photographs.

The

evidence was accurately depicted in either exhibit number eleven or
twelve but became cumulative when both were admitted.

Likewise,

evidence portrayed in any of the exhibits numbered ten, fifteen or
sixteen may have been probative but became cumulative when all three
photographs were admitted.

Numerous photographs of the same

evidence carry no "essential evidentiary value" and should have been
excluded.
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The trial court not only erred in admitting the
inflamatory evidence, the error was not harmless.3

where two large

color photographs of truck parts and three large color photographs
of the truck and the body were all admitted and published to the
jury, undue emphasis was placed on this prejudicial display of
gruesome facts. There was no dispute Mr. Chandler died at the scene
and had been driving his truck at the time of impact.

The force of

the impact and position of the red truck was described to the jury
through witnesses at the scene, and the prosecutor even used models
of the cars over defense counsel's objection during his opening
statement.

(T. 96, 109, 111, 134, 202, 227, 241, 251, 252, 269,

317-18, 323-24).

Therefore, under the standards set forth in Utah

Rules of Evidence 403 and the rationale of Cloud, Poe, Garcia and
Wells, Mr. Pascoe's conviction ought to be reversed.

3 A conviction will not be reversed unless the admission
of evidence affected the substantial rights of the defendant. Utah
Code Ann. §77-35-30(a) (1982), Utah Rules of Evidence 103(a).
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CONCLUSION
For any and all of the above-m0ntioned reasons,
Mr. Pascoe asks this Court to reverse his conviction and to remand
his case for a new trial.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this
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ADDENDUM A

76-5-207. Automobile homicide.
(1) (a) Criminal homicide is automobile homicide, a third degree felony, if
the actor operates a motor vehicle while having a blood alcohol content of
.08% or greater by weight, or while under the influence of alcohol or any
drug, or the combined influence of alcohol and any drug, to a degree that
renders the actor incapable of safely operating the vehicle, and causes the
death of another by operating the vehicle in a negligent manner.
(b) For the purpose of this subsection, "negligent" means simple negligence, the failure to exercise that degree of care which reasonable and
prudent persons exercise under like or similar circumstances.
(2) (a) Criminal homicide is automobile homicide, a second degree felony, if
the actor operates a motor vehicle while having a blood alcohol content of
.08% or greater by weight, or while under the influence of alcohol or any
drug, or the combined influence of alcohol and any drug, to a degree
which renders the actor incapable of safely operating the vehicle, and
causes the death of another by operating the motor vehicle in a criminally
negligent manner.
(b) For the purpose of this subsection, "criminally negligent" means
criminal negligence as defined by Subsection 76-2-103(4).
(3) The standards for chemical breath analysis as provided by Section
41-6-44.3 and the provisions for the admissibility of chemical test results as
provided by Section 41-6-44.5 apply to determination and proof of blood alcohol content under this section.
(4) Percent by weight of alcohol in the blood shall be based upon grams of
alcohol per one hundred cubic centimeters of l^lood.
(5) The fact that a person charged with violating this section is on or has
been legally entitled to use alcohol or a drug is not a defense to any charge of
violating this section.
(6) Any chemical test is admissible in accordance with the Rules of Evidence if administered on a defendant:
(a) with his consent; or
(b) without his consent after his arrest either under this section or
under Section 41-6-44, when the officer has reason to believe that the
victim may die.
(7) (a) After a defendant is placed under arrest for a violation of this section, the peace officer shall require that the defendant submit to a chemical test of his blood or urine. This test may be required without the
consent of the defendant, as provided in Subsection (6)(b).
(b) The test required under this subsection does not prohibit the administration of other additional chemical tests under this section.
(8) For purposes of this section, "motor vehicle" means any self-propelled
vehicle and includes, but is not limited to, any automobile, truck, van, motorcycle, train, engine, watercraft, or aircraft.

